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ABSTRACT
FREEDOM AS MORALITY
by
Hao Liang
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014
Under the Supervision of Professor William F. Bristow
In this paper, I offer a reading concerning Kant’s concept of freedom and its relation to
morality. In Groundwork III, Kant deduces morality from freedom, such strategy in
which requires a metaphysical understanding of freedom. However, according to Kant’s
argument in the first Critique, we do not have knowledge of freedom as an idea of reason.
That is: we cannot know that we are free. In the second Critique, Kant clams that
morality is a “fact of reason”, which is not dependent on any antecedent data. We could
cognize that we are free when we are conscious of the moral law. In this paper, I do some
preliminary work regarding this argumentative shift in Kant’s moral philosophy. I
reconstruct Kant’s arguments in the Groundwork III and the second Critique to show that
freedom as an idea of reason gains its reality from a practical standpoint view.
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1. Introduction
Freedom is a central concept in Kant’s moral philosophy. According to Kant,
morality requires absolute freedom that is not in the phenomenal realm. There is an
argumentative shift in Kant’s philosophy regarding such absolute freedom and its relation
to morality. In Groundwork III, Kant deduces morality from freedom, such strategy in
which requires a metaphysical understanding of freedom. However, according to Kant’s
argument in the first Critique, we do not have knowledge of freedom as an idea of reason.
That is: we cannot know that we are free. In the second Critique, Kant clams that
morality is a “fact of reason”, which is not dependent on any antecedent data. We could
cognize that we are free when we are conscious of the moral law. In this paper, I do some
preliminary work regarding this shift in Kant’s moral philosophy. I connect Kant’s
arguments in the Groundwork III and the second Critique to argue that freedom as an
idea of reason gains its reality from practical perspective.
My argument is structured as follows. In the first part, I reconstruct Kant’s
argument in the Groundwork III. I show that Kant’s conception of freedom is closely
connected with the will that is a special kind of causality belonging to rational beings. I
further analyze the complexity of Kant’s argumentative strategy in the Groundwork. On
the one hand, Kant deduces morality from freedom to prove that morality is real. On the
other hand, Kant maintains the upshot of his arguments in the first Critique: it is beyond
our capacity to know freedom as an idea of pure reason. I suggest that Kant’s argument is
essentially a theoretical one although he realizes that morality is a practical conception. In
Groundwork, Kant does not have a full-fledged practical conception of morality. In the
second part, I focus on Kant’s conception of “the fact of reason” in his Critique of
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Practical Reason to show that Kant shifts his theoretical perspective to a practical
perspective concerning morality and freedom. Morality, as a practical consciousness,
does not need to be deduced from any antecedent data. Freedom, I argue, is changed from
transcendent use into immanent use in the moral consciousness. In this way, freedom is
no more an idea, but has reality. In the third part, I connect my argument with the unity of
reason. I show that although from speculative perspective we cannot know freedom as an
idea of pure reason, from practical perspective our cognition of freedom is extended.
Freedom, as the keystone combines two interests of reason into a whole.
	
  

	
  

2. Freedom and Morality in the Groundwork
2.1 Reciprocity Thesis
Freedom, in Kant’s theory, is not concerned with our capacity of a free choice; rather it is
the property of the will. As Kant says,
Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, and
freedom would be that property of such causality that it can be efficient
independently of alien causes determining it, just as natural necessity is the
property of the causality of all non rational beings to be determined to activity by
the influence of alien causes. (4:446)
Will, for Kant, is not simply given by human beings’ biological structure. It is a kind of
causality that belongs to rational living beings. Freedom is the property of such special
kind of causality. The relation between will and freedom could be put in this way: will is
a free will, and freedom is the freedom of will, not of a choice. The reason that will is
free lies in the fact that it is about a special kind of causality. The specialty of this kind of
causality is shown in the contrast with natural causality.
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For all the non-rational beings, the causality in them has the property of natural

necessity. That’s because non-rational beings’ activities are determined by the influences
of causes external to them. They don’t have self-determinacy. For all the rational beings,
in contrast, they have a special kind of causality in them. Freedom is the property of such
causality. Because of this special kind of causality, rational beings are able to determine
their activities independent of causes external to them. They have self-determinacy. Put
in another way, they can be the cause of their activities without being influenced by
external causes.
This special kind of causality in rational beings makes them free, i.e., rational
beings are able to be the cause of their activities. Since it is causality, the activities have
to be caused by something, rather than nothing. Thus, such special kind of causality
introduces an idea of making laws to itself, i.e., categorical imperative.
Since the concept of causality brings with it that of laws in accordance with
which, by something that we call a cause, something else, namely an effect, must
be posited, so freedom, although it is not a property of the will in accordance with
natural laws, is not for that reason lawless but must instead be a causality in
accordance with immutable laws but of a special kind; for otherwise a free will
would be an absurdity. Natural necessity was a heteronomy of efficient causes,
since every effect was possible only in accordance with the law that something
else determines the efficient cause of causality; what, then, can freedom of the
will be other than autonomy, that is the will’s property of being a law to itself?
But the proposition, the will is in all its actions to a law to itself, indicates only the
principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as object itself
as a universal law. This, however, is precisely the formula of the categorical
imperative and is the principle of morality; hence a free will and a will under
moral laws are one and the same. [4:447]
The concept of freedom or free will has a negative meaning and a positive
meaning. Negative freedom tells us what freedom is not, i.e., not being determined by
alien / external causes. It does not give us information about what freedom is. With
respect to the positive meaning of freedom, as the quote above shows, “what, then, can
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freedom of the will be other than autonomy, that is, the will’s property of being a law to
itself?” (G 4:447) Positive conception of freedom is equated with autonomy, i.e., selfdetermination, or self-legislation. There are two reasons for this equation. First, positive
freedom as a special causality is law-like, rather than something that is totally random or
uncertain. Secondly, positive freedom is not governed by a natural law. That is: positive
freedom is not constrained by natural necessity. These two constraints make the positive
conception of freedom nothing but making laws for itself. A will that can make laws to
itself is a will under morality.
At this point, what we know is that a free will and a will under morality are the
same. In the second critique, Kant puts the same point as “freedom and unconditional
practical law reciprocally imply each other”(5:29). This claim is called the Reciprocity
Thesis. Given freedom of the will and a will under morality are the same, we still don’t
know what is the strategy of the deduction of morality. In the Groundwork, Kant asserts
that freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all rational beings. He says,
reason must regard itself as the author of its principles independently of alien
influences; consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it
must be regarded of itself as free, that is, the will of such a being cannot be a will
of his own except under the idea of freedom, and such a will must in a practical
respect thus be attributed to every rational beings. (4:448)
As the quotation shows above, Kant maintains the distinction between nonrational beings and rational beings. The former are determined by alien /external causes,
while the later can be the author of their principles. If practical reason has to be the author
of itself, the will of a rational being has to be free. Otherwise, such a being is still
influenced by alien causes. In this sense, a free will is the necessary condition for a
practical reason to have self-determinacy. The reciprocal circle between freedom and
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morality is broken by this formulation concerning the relation between a free will and a
will that is the author of itself. It seems like the strategy of Kant’s argument in the
Groundwork is to deduce morality from freedom. To put it explicitly, if rational beings
have free will, they can be the cause of their principles independently of alien / external
causes. Consequently, they are able to give laws to themselves, i.e., they are moral.
In order to show that morality is real rather than a chimerical idea in our mind,
Kant has to show that freedom of the will is real. However, concerning the freedom of the
will, there is a tension in Kant’s remark. Kant claims that “the will of such a being cannot
be a will of his own except under the idea of freedom, and such a will must in a practical
respect thus be attributed to every rational beings”. The first half of the remark is shown
as a theoretical proposal: if a will is put under the idea of freedom, such a will is a free
will. The key is to prove that freedom is real. However, according to Kant’s theory in the
first Critique, we cannot judge whether freedom is real or not because it is an idea of pure
reason. There’s an intrinsic difficulty in this proposal. While the second half of the
remark is shown as a practical proposal: from a practical respect, a free will has to be
attributed to every rational being. The key to this proposal is to make sense of a practical
respect. With respect to this tension, I suggest that although Kant maintains the upshot of
his arguments in the first Critique, he still considers freedom as the antecedent data of the
deduction of morality. His argumentative strategy in the Groundwork is a theoretical one.
In order to make sense of practical moral activity, Kant has to make a move to ask
rational beings to consider themselves as free. Although Kant realizes that morality is a
practical conception, he has not completely shifted his perspective into a practical point
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of view in the Groundwork. The transition from a theoretical perspective to practical
perspective is completed in the second Critique.

2.2 Deduction of morality
Kant’s deduction of morality is a complicated project. In this section, I will describe this
project in big strokes by reconstructing it in three steps. Kant’s strategy of the deduction
of morality is a theoretical project in essence. He tries to prove that positive freedom as
the necessary condition of morality is possible. Consequently, the categorical imperative
is possible. If this deduction failed, it would be because of this theoretical attitude.

Step 1:
Freedom of the will is concerned with a rational being. In order to prove that freedom is
possible, Kant firstly introduces the distinction between three different faculties that a
person has in the Critique of Pure Reason. As he says in the Groundwork III,
Now, a human being really finds in himself a capacity by which he distinguishes
himself from all other things, even from himself insofar as he is affected by
objects, and that is reason. This, as pure self-activity, is raised even above the
understanding by this: that though the latter is also self-activity and does not, like
sense, contain merely representations that arise when we are affected by things
(and are thus passive), yet it can produce from its activity no other concepts than
those which serve merely to bring sensible representations under rules and
thereby to unite them in one consciousness, without which use of sensibility it
would think nothing at all; but reason, on the contrary, shows in what we call
“ideas” a spontaneity so pure that it thereby goes far beyond anything that
sensibility can ever afford it, and proves its highest occupation in distinguishing
the world of sense and the world of understanding from each other and thereby
marking our limits for the understanding itself. (4:452)
In this passage, Kant does not just repeat his doctrine in the first Critique: our faculty of
sensibility is passive because it is affected by things to form representations, while our
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faculty of understanding is active because it can bring different representations under one
consciousness by certain rules. Kant also introduces a new point: self-activity of the
understanding is different from the spontaneity of ideas of reason in degree. Although the
former is self-active, the activity of understanding still needs sensibility to bring
representations to it. In this sense, the rules of the understanding can only be applied to
objects that are conditioned. The activity of reason, in contrast, is pure spontaneity that it
does not need sensibility to offer any material. For Kant, reason is the source for rational
beings to think of the unconditioned. Although some scholars criticize Kant that the
spontaneity of ideas is just an epistemic capacity, I think that this capacity of thinking the
unconditioned offers the ground of morality as categorical imperative because morality
demands people to act according to the moral laws necessarily and universally.

Step 2:
Since a rational being has sensibility, understanding and reason, he is at the same time
bound by experience and not bound by experience. In the latter sense, she is free. But she
is free only when she considers herself as to belonging to another world.
A rational being counts himself, as intelligence, as belonging to the world of
understanding, and only as an efficient cause belonging to this does he call his
causality a will. On the other side he is also conscious of himself as a part of the
world of sense, in which his actions are found as mere appearances of that
causality; but their possibility from that causality of which we are not cognizant
cannot be seen; instead, those actions as belonging to the world of sense must be
regarded as determined by other appearances, namely desires and inclinations. All
my actions as only a member of the world of understanding would therefore
conform perfectly with the principle of autonomy of the pure will; as only of the
world of sense they would have to be taken to conform wholly to the natural law
of desires and inclinations, hence to the heteronomy of nature. (The former would
rest on the supreme principle of morality, the latter on that of happiness.) But
because the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and
so too of its laws, and is therefore immediately lawgiving with respect to my will
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(which belongs wholly to the world of understanding) and must accordingly also
be thought as such, it follows that I shall cognize myself as intelligence, though
on the other side as a being belonging to the world of sense, as nevertheless
subject to the law of the world of understanding, that is, of reason, which contains
in the idea of freedom the law of the world of understanding, and thus cognize
myself as subject to the autonomy of the will; consequently the laws of the world
of understanding must be regarded as imperatives for me, and actions in
conformity with these as duties. (4:454)

The distinction between the world of understanding and the world of sense is no more an
epistemic point. Rather, Kant is making a distinction of two worlds from a practical point
of view. When a rational being belongs to the world of sense, his action is caused by
other appearances, such as desires and inclinations. But when he counts himself as
belonging to the world of understanding, he is the efficient cause of his activities. He is
free in the sense that he is not bound by any previous appearance. In this sense, in the
world of understanding, a rational being has autonomy of the will. In other words, he is
free.
The problem is that a rational being is in the empirical world in which he is bound
by law of nature. How could he at the same time be free in the empirical world? In order
to solve that problem, Kant introduces the relation between the world of understanding
and the world of sense. The former one is the ground of the latter. By “ground” Kant
means at lease four different aspects.
(1) “the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and so too
of its laws”. The world of understanding is the ground of the laws in the world of
sense. Laws in the world of sense are natural laws. Hence, the ground of natural
laws lies in the world of understanding not the world of sense.
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(2) “and is therefore immediately lawgiving with respect to my will (which belongs
wholly to the world of understanding)”. In the world of understanding, a rational
being gives law to his will without any mediation.
(3) “it follows that I shall cognize myself as intelligence, though on the other side as a
being belonging to the world of sense, as nevertheless subject to the law of the
world of understanding, that is, of reason, which contains in the idea of freedom
the law of the world of understanding, and thus cognize myself as subject to the
autonomy of the will”. Although a rational being is in the world of sense where he
is bound by the natural law, when he cognizes himself as intelligence he is subject
to the autonomy of the will at the same time. These two subjections could happen
in the same person at the same time.
(4) “consequently the laws of the world of understanding must be regarded as
imperatives for me, and actions in conformity with these as duties.” Since the
world of understanding is the ground of the world of sense, the laws of the world
of understanding is imperative for a rational agent. It’s controversial whether
there is a gap between “ground” and “imperative” in Kant’s argument. I don’t
have enough space to defend Kant here. The key to keep in mind is that the laws
in the world of understanding are the ground of natural laws in the world of sense.
For a rational being, he has duties to obey the laws in the world of understanding
prior to the natural laws in the world of sense, although subjecting to the latter is
much easier.

Step 3:
And so categorical imperatives are possible by this: the idea of freedom makes me
a member of an intelligible world and consequently, if I were only this, all my
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actions would always be in conformity with the autonomy of the will; but since at
the same time I intuit myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought to be
in conformity with it; and this categorical ought represents a synthetic proposition
a priori, since to my will affected by sensible desires there is added the idea of the
same will but belonging to the world of the understanding- a will pure and
practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition , in accordance with
reason, of the former will; this is roughly like the way in which concepts of the
understanding, which by themselves signify nothing but lawful form in general,
are added to intuitions of the world of sense, and thereby make possible synthetic
proposition a priori on which all cognition of a nature rests. (G 4:454)

Since Kant proves that the intelligible world is the ground of the world of sense in the last
step, categorical imperative is possible only if the will affected by sensible desires is
added by an autonomous will in the intelligible world. It is similar to the relation between
sensibility and concepts of the understanding in the formation of epistemic cognition.
Sensibility offers intuitions and the concepts offer the lawful form. Our knowledge is a
synthetic proposition that combines intuitions and concepts together. Similarly, if
apperception is the key in the formation of knowledge, then freedom is the key in the
deduction of morality. To further understand freedom, we have to understand the relation
between the idea of freedom, intelligible world and the sensible world.

2.3 Two worlds
In order to make the deduction of morality work, Kant has to prove that freedom
as the premise of the deduction is real. Since Kant separates the intelligible world from
the sensible world, it is natural for us to understand them as two ontological worlds. If
this is correct, then the argument, putting it explicitly, should be like this: if there is an
ontologically intelligible world, in which rational beings are able to act according to the
categorical imperative based on an autonomous will, then morality is real, not an illusion
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in our mind. It is important to notice that a metaphysical understanding of freedom in an
intelligible world is a key to proving the objectivity of morality in Groundwork III. 1
However, this metaphysical understanding of freedom is problematic. First of all,
it raises various puzzles concerning the connection between the intelligible world and the
sensible world. As members of the sensible world, we seem to be determined by natural
inclination and therefore cannot choose merely according to the categorical imperative.
Given that we are entirely autonomous in the intelligible world, the question of how that
autonomy influences our actions in the sensible world is still unanswered. As Wood and
other philosophers have emphasized, intelligible causality and timeless agency are
mysterious2. And thus this ontological view carries too much of a metaphysical burden.
Secondly, from the perspective of epistemology, it is problematic to base the
positive conception of freedom on an ontological intelligible world. Transcendental
freedom, if we take it to occur in an intelligible world that is totally beyond our empirical
world, is impossible for human beings to intuit. According to Kant’s theory of cognition,
sensible intuitions and concepts are the two conditions for human experience. We do not
have a third faculty called intellectual intuition. Without intuition of transcendental
freedom, we do not have any knowledge of it at all. Furthermore, transcendental freedom
is not the necessary condition of the possibility of our knowledge, such as categories. So,
we cannot assume its existence based on the possibility of human knowledge. Thus the
deduction of morality does not work and the metaphysical understanding of freedom fails.
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Based on what Kant says in G III, an ontological reading of such an intelligible world is a
plausible reading; especially in the whole Groundwork Kant tries to prove morality as part of
knowledge. Kant uses the word “proposition” to refer to the synthetic cognition, which shows that
he has theoretical attitude to prove morality when he wrote the Groundwork.
2
Allen W. Wood, ‘Kant’s Compatibilism’ in Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1984), pp.73-101
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Further, putting these epistemological difficulties of intuiting transcendental

freedom in an intelligible world aside, there is a more important reason for us to reject the
ontological understanding of freedom. Kant not only introduces the intelligible world and
the sensible world; he also introduces a relation between them. On his view, “the world
of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and so too of its laws, and is
therefore immediately lawgiving with respect to my will”. (G454, emphasis added). If we
read the intelligible world and the sensible world to be two separate worlds, then the
grounding relation between them is metaphysical, not normative. By a metaphysical
grounding relation, I mean that we could appeal to the transcendental freedom in the
intelligible world to give an explanation of our freedom to act according to the moral law
in the empirical world. For example, I can choose freely because I am a member of the
intelligible world, where I have transcendental freedom and a member of the world of
sense at the same time. Given that human beings have transcendental freedom in a
separate intelligible world, what we can infer from it is merely that transcendental
freedom makes our empirical free choice possible metaphysically. But we are still left
with the question of why human beings ought to choose freely, namely to act according
to the moral law. Freedom for Kant is not a concept concerning free choice, but is
intimately connected with the conception of autonomy, i.e., giving laws to itself. In order
to make Kant’s argument work, I will argue later, it is better to understand the relation
between the intelligible world and the world of sense as practical, not metaphysical. Our
membership in the intelligible world does not determine our free actions according to the
moral law metaphysically; rather, that membership gives us a normative / moral calling,
and thus opens the possibility for us to act not according to the sensible inclinations.
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Due to the three reasons above, Kant’s deduction of morality fails based on a

metaphysical understanding of freedom. In Groundwork III, Kant tries to save his
deduction by shifting to a standpoint view of freedom. I don’t have space to go deeper to
evaluate his standpoint view here. But it’s enough to point out that Kant gave up his
deduction of morality after all because he realizes that morality and its connection to
freedom of the will is fundamentally a practical question, not a theoretical one. In the
Ground work III, Kant has not worked out full-fledged accounts of morality and freedom
from practical point of view. This work is finished in the second Critique.

3. Morality and Freedom in the CPrR
3.1 The Fact of Reason
After giving up the deduction of morality from theoretical perspective in Groundwork III,
in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant introduces the “fact of reason” as a new starting
point of his argument. As we will see, this new approach is from the practical perspective.
He says,
Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason because one
cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason, for example, from
consciousness of freedom (since this is not antecedently given to us) and because
it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition that is
not based on any intuition, either pure or empirical, although it would be analytic
if the freedom of the will were presupposed; but for this, as a positive concept, an
intellectual intuition would be required, which certainly cannot be assumed here.
However, in order to avoid misinterpretation in regarding this law as given, it
must be noted carefully that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of pure
reason [emphasis added], which, by it, announces itself as originally lawgiving.
(5:31)
The passage just cited shows that Kant has given up the argumentative strategy in the
Groundwork to prove the reality of morality, i.e., to deduce morality from freedom. First,
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Kant sees morality as a fact of pure reason that cannot be deduced from anything
antecedent to it. This is a new strategy because Kant deduces freedom from morality in
the second Critique. Second, morality would be analytically deduced if the freedom of
the will were presupposed. But, since human beings do not have intellectual intuition, it
is impossible to prove the freedom of will from speculative reason’s point of view.
Is Kant committed to a kind of Intuitionism or Dogmatism with his claim of “the
fact of reason”? No. But for the purpose of this paper, I cannot show Kant’s argument of
“the fact of reason” in detail. What is significant for my argument is that Kant gives us a
hint to understand this special fact, i.e., it is the consciousness of the fundamental law.
Paralleling the big shift in argumentative strategy mentioned above, Kant gives up
looking for a third cognition to combine free will and morality together; rather, he returns
to the consciousness of the moral law. Consciousness of the moral law is in everyone’s
practical thinking and deliberation.
What is the structure of the consciousness of the fundamental moral principle?
Let’s consider a famous example in the second critique about false testimony. A person
was demanded by his prince to give false testimony against an innocent person. The
prince threatened him with death were he to fail to obey. Kant claims that,
This man would perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but
he must admit without hesitation that it would be possible for him. He judges,
therefore, that he can do something because he is aware that he ought to do it and
cognizes freedom within him, which without the moral law, would have remained
unknown to him.” (5:30) [emphasis added]
As I read the passage, Kant is saying that in order to say that this man has the possibility
to act against his own national inclination, i.e., the fear of death, there are two
constraining components: first, he must be aware of what he ought to do. That is to say
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that he must be conscious of the moral law. Secondly, he has to be able to cognize
freedom within himself. Recall the upshot of Kant’s arguments in the first Critique: we
do not have knowledge of freedom as an idea of pure reason. Consequently, this
cognition of freedom is of course not a speculative cognition, which requires our
intellectual intuition of the transcendental freedom. On the contrary, this cognition is
purely practical in the sense that through being aware of the moral law the agent is able to
cognize freedom in herself. That is to say that she has agency to act not according to the
sensible inclinations, but the law given by herself, i.e., categorical imperative. It is
important to notice that with this second constraint, freedom is no longer a mere idea;
rather, when we are conscious of the moral law, practical cognition of freedom is real in
each agent’s consciousness.
Based on the analysis above, in the next section, I draw attention to Kant’s
argument about freedom as immanent in contrast with transcendent freedom. I argue that
this immanence of freedom in Kant’s argument fulfills the second constraint above, i.e.,
the ability of the agent to cognize freedom within herself. I hope thereby to shed some
light from the second critique on the puzzle of the positive conception of freedom in
Groundwork III.

3.2 Transcendent Freedom and Immanent Freedom
As Kant famously says in the preface of the second critique, “the concept of
freedom constitutes the keystone of a system of pure reason.” (5:4). It seems like
understanding the concept of freedom is pivotal for us to understand Kant’s system. I
attempt to argue that Kant uses the conception of immanent freedom versus transcendent
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freedom to characterize the positive conception of freedom. This strategy, as we will see,
maintains, on the one hand, the distinction between theoretical reason and practical
reason, while on the other, it makes freedom real in the agent’s practical consciousness.
From this perspective, immanent freedom is the key for us to understand the possibility
of pure practical reason, which is the essence of “the fact of reason” as the consciousness
of moral law.
In the introduction of the CPrR, Kant first mentions the contrast between
immanent and transcendent use of pure reason. He says,
If it is proved that there is pure reason, its use is alone immanent; the empirically
conditioned use, which lays claims to absolute rule, is on the contrary
transcendent and expresses itself in demands and commands that go quite beyond
its sphere—precisely the opposite relation from what could be said of pure reason
in its speculative use. (5:16)
It’s a little bit abrupt to introduce this passage without considering the context. The
context of this passage is to show why there is no need of Critique of Pure Practical
Reason; rather, Critique of Practical Reason is enough. Kant famously argues that there is
a sharp distinction between the theoretical and practical use of reason. The theoretical use
of reason is concerned with the objects of cognitive faculty while the practical use of
reason is concerned with the determining grounds of the will. There is a need of critique
of pure (theoretical) reason because pure cognitive faculty has the tendency to go beyond
its boundary to cognize unattainable objects and form contradictory concepts. But, there
is no need of critique of pure practical reason because pure practical reason can of itself
determine the will. The task of the second critique is to ask “whether pure reason itself
alone suffices to determine the will or whether it can be a determining ground of the will
only as empirically conditioned.” (5:16) Kant points out immediately that in order to
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answer that question, we have to consider the conception of causality. In the first Critique,
although it is justified by itself, natural causality is never empirically presented. Now, in
the second Critique, if Kant can find the grounds for showing that a special kind of
causality belongs to the human will, then pure reason alone can be practical.
Bearing this distinction between theoretical and practical reason in mind, when
we read back to the quotation above, Kant draws a distinction between immanent and
transcendent use of reason. For him, from a practical standpoint, the use of pure reason
alone is immanent. If we question its empirically conditioned use, such as human being’s
desires and inclinations, then pure practical reason transgresses its boundary. From a
theoretical standpoint, in contrast, we can only know objects in the empirical domain. If
we want to know the object that goes beyond the phenomenal sphere, the use of pure
reason is transcendent.
Now, with respect to freedom, I suggest that it is immanent from a practical
standpoint since pure practical reason determines the will that is free. I will specify in
what sense freedom is immanent later. However, if we question the empirical condition
of freedom from a theoretical standpoint, the answer will lead us to go beyond reason’s
own boundary. It is transcendent. The reason lies in the fact that we do not have an
intuition of the ideas of reason [God, Immortality and Freedom] at all. Pure practical
reason is not empirical since it is both immanent in our free actions, and is never
presented empirically. Although we don’t have experience of pure practical reason, it is
in our actions.
Regarding the positive conception of freedom, it contains a paradoxical
requirement. On the one hand, positive freedom cannot be deduced from the empirical
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world since everything in the empirical, i.e., phenomenal world is determined by natural
necessity. If it is to be independent of natural necessity, freedom has to be beyond the
empirical world. In this sense, freedom is transcendent. On the other hand, positive
conception of freedom is just a mere idea of reason. It is beyond our theoretical cognition.
Human beings don’t have intellectual intuition to cognize it. If positive freedom is real
rather than some phantom in our mind, it has to be immanent in human beings’ actions
although it differs from an empirical fact. It must be manifested in a particular person’s
actions. Then, how could this paradoxical requirement be? This is Kant’s suggestion.
In this they [freedom, immortality and God] become immanent and constitutive
inasmuch as they are grounds of the possibility of making real the necessary
object of pure practical reason, whereas apart from this they are transcendent and
merely regulative principles of speculative reason which do not require it to
assume a new object beyond experience but only to bring its use in experience
nearer to completeness. (5:135)
As the passage just says, transcendent freedom, for Kant, is merely a regulative principle.
What is the regulative use of reason? Kant does not give us a clear definition in the
second Critique. But at least we know that, first, a regulative principle concerns
theoretical / speculative reason; secondly, as Kant says in the Metaphysics of Morals,
“the concept of freedom cannot hold as constitutive but solely as a regulative and, indeed,
merely negative principle of speculative reason.” (6:221) A regulative principle as
negative principle of reason cannot determine an object beyond experience. With respect
to freedom, such principle can only offer a negative conception of freedom, i.e., freedom
is not determined by the alien causes. But, it cannot offer a positive conception of
freedom because transcendent use of freedom lacks the immediate determination of the
will. Thus the positive conception of freedom cannot be found by way of a regulative
principle of speculative reason. Immanent use of freedom, in contrast, plays a constitutive
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role in our practical consciousness. Because of its constitutive function, it is the ground of
the possibility of making the object of practical reason real3. This possibility is in the
essence of “the fact of reason” as the consciousness of moral law.
There is another place in the second Critique where Kant uses the same strategy
to show the positive conception of freedom that converts a transcendent use of reason
into an immanent use. As he puts it,
By adding a positive determination to a causality thought only negatively, the
possibility of which was incomprehensible to speculative reason, which was
nevertheless forced to assume it; it adds, namely, the concept of a reason
determining the will immediately and thus is able for the first time to give
objective though only practical reality to reason, which always became
extravagant when it wanted to proceed speculatively with its ideas, and changes
its transcendent use into an immanent use (in which reason is by means of ideas
itself an efficient cause in the field of experience). (5:48)
In this passage, Kant connects practical reason with a positive determination of causality.
He highlights that in order for the pure practical reason to determine will immediately,
i.e., to give objective but only practical reality to reason, transcendent use of reason has
to be changed into immanent use. In the immanent use of reason, Kant explains reason is
“by means of ideas itself an efficient cause in the field of experience”. Although, it is
beyond this paper’s goal to explain how ideas of reason could be an efficient cause in the
field of experience, it is enough to point out that for Kant, transcendent ideas as purely
regulative principles of reason in the theoretical domain cannot help to solve a practical
problem. The objectivity of morality is based on the immanent use of reason, not just
ideas. In this sense, all the ideas of reason including God, Immortality and Freedom are
changed from negative position into positive position. In the next part, we will explore
this positive freedom.
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Henry Allison claims that, “this consciousness, then, is of a mere possibility rather than an
actual capacity.” in his book Kant’s theory of freedom, p.246.
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To summarize, in all the passages cited above as we see, Kant introduces this

conception of immanent use of freedom versus transcendent use of freedom to clarify the
special conception of freedom in his system. Freedom as an object of our practical
consciousness is always transcendent, at least in the sense that it is beyond our
consciousness of empirical objects. However, its transcendence cannot be understood as a
relation to another ontological world. The idea of transcendent freedom is merely
regulative. There is no room for speculative reason to question how transcendent freedom
is possible. The positive conception of freedom brings the transcendent use of reason into
immanent use, and this positive freedom constitutes the possibility of a special kind of
causality in rational beings, i.e., the fact of reason as consciousness of the moral law. As
the result of the conception of immanent use of freedom versus transcendent use of
freedom, the distinction between speculative /theoretical reason and practical reason is
maintained. At the same time, we do not need to appeal to an ontological distinction
between the intelligible world and the empirical world to characterize the relation
between transcendent freedom and immanent freedom. Freedom has always a dimension
beyond empirical consciousness and it is toward the transcendental freedom. But it is just
toward an idea rather than a real ontological world. Transcendent freedom can only play
a role in the practical domain through immanent freedom. By itself, as an idea, it cannot
ground the fact of reason at all.

3.3 Regulative vs. Constitutive Principles
We are now in a position to rethink the relation between freedom and morality.
For Kant, morality commands us to obey the moral law. But we are not forced to obey;
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rather, we freely to answer the calling from categorical imperative. Freedom is intimately
connected with morality. As we have shown earlier, there are two different ways for
freedom to be connected with morality. If my argument is correct, we should not accept
the ontological understanding of freedom. That we, as imperfect rational beings, can obey
the moral law is not grounded on an ontological fact that we are purely practical without
being influenced by natural inclinations in the intelligible world. Rather, our freedom is
grounded by a practical fact: we are conscious of the moral law in our consciousness. In
this part, I will connect this conception of freedom as morality with the idea of the
immanent use of freedom discussed above.
As we have seen, the transcendent use of freedom is a regulative principle of pure
reason. Although Kant does not explicitly explain what a regulative use is in the second
Critique, fortunately, he does have some remarks in the first Critique.
The ideal of the highest being is, according to these considerations,
nothing other than a regulative principle of reason, to regard all
combination in the world as if it arose from an all-sufficient necessary
cause, so as to ground on that cause the rule of a unity that is
systematic and necessary according to universal laws; but it is not an
assertion of an existence that is necessary in itself. (A619/B647)
The “highest being” is an example of a regulative principle of reason. Although we don’t
have knowledge of the experience of God, the idea of the highest being functions as an
assumption in a systematic unity of human knowledge. A regulative principle of reason is
used in the theoretical domain, which concerns the unity of our knowledge. It is not
concerned with our practical activities. With respect to freedom, such regulative principle
functions as an assumption in the system of knowledge. We know that we have to assume
freedom in order to make sense of morality as part of knowledge. But freedom as an
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assumption in the system of knowledge does not have connections with morality in the
practical domain. If we accept the metaphysical understanding of freedom, then the idea
of freedom is merely transcendent to us. Only when the transcendent use freedom is
brought into immanent use, can we be free in practice.
The immanent use of reason, as we have seen in the third part, is a constitutive
principle of reason. What is a constitutive principle? Kant does not give us an explicit
answer. However, in the first Critique, we could find a clue.
Thus it [cosmological principle of totality] is not a principle of the
possibility of experience and of empirical cognition of objects of sense,
hence not a principle of the understanding, for every experience is
enclosed within its boundaries; nor is it a constitutive principle of reason
for extending the concept of the world of sense beyond all possible
experience. (A509 / B537)
This passage shows that for Kant an idea of reason is merely a regulative principle, not a
constitutive principle. If a regulative principle and a constitutive principle are contrary to
each other, then we could infer from the passage just cited that a constitutive principle of
reason could in some sense constitute an object beyond experience. From theoretical
perspective, a regulative principle of reason cannot constitute freedom as an object, since
such cognition has already gone beyond the limit of human beings. But, it does not rule
out the possibility that when a transcendent idea is transformed into immanent use,
practical reason does constitute an object: the highest good. This is not an empirical
object, but a practical or moral object. When we are conscious of the moral law, we have
the practical cognition of freedom. In this way, pure practical reason determines our will.
Before ending this section, I would like to address two misunderstandings of
Kant’s account of freedom and morality. The first misunderstanding is: since morality
demands us to act according to the categorical imperative, such necessity determines our
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will to do so. Consequently, there is no room to explain that there are people who do not
obey the moral law. In my account of Kant’s conception of freedom, I emphasize that it is
the consciousness of the moral law (the fact of reason) that brings the transcendent use of
freedom into its immanent use. To put it in another way, morality is the condition to
connect such freedom with our moral agency. But, morality does not force us. Kant’s
theory on freedom and morality leaves room for explanation of not obeying the moral law.
Since freedom as the property of a special kind of causality is belonging to the rational
beings, morality is just a calling rather than a natural force on us. If we were totally
rational, our actions would be completely in conformity with categorical imperatives.
Since human beings are not totally rational, it is natural to see people who do not act
according to the moral law in everyday situation.
The second misunderstanding is about freedom. In Kant’s theory, morality and
freedom are hand in hand. But some people might raise an objection that for those people
who do not obey the moral law, they still have the capacity to choose between having
spaghetti or Chinese food for dinner. It seems like they still have freedom. I would like to
draw a distinction between freedom as a capacity of free choice and freedom as a rational
capacity to give laws to oneself. Kant is not concerned with an account of our natural
capacity to choose between two means to fulfill a given end. Freedom, in Kant’s theory,
is a rational agency to act according to the law given by oneself. In this sense, it is
intimately connected with morality. Not obeying the categorical imperative entails this
person’s lacking of autonomy, but not the capacity of a free choice.
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4. The Unity of Reason
4.1 Two interests
Kant claims that the concept of freedom is “the keystone of the whole structure of a
system of pure reason”. In what sense freedom is the keystone? In this section, I connect
my reconstructions of Kant’s arguments concerning freedom and morality in the
Groundwork III and the second Critique with the idea of the unity of reason. I attempt to
show that how my special characterization of the positive concept of freedom help us
understand Kant’s big project.
The idea of unity of reason contains two points. The first is the claim that there is
only one reason. Theoretical (Kant uses theoretical and speculative reason
interchangeably) reason and practical reason are not two reasons but one reason with two
different interests. “The interest of its speculative use consists in the cognition of the
object up to the highest a priori principles; that of its practical use consists in the
determination of the will with respect to the final and complete end.” (5:120) The second
point of the unity of reason is the claim that reason’s practical interest has primacy over
its theoretical interest. Since speculative reason and practical reason are in one unit of
cognition, in order to avoid a conflict between them either the former subordinates to the
latter, or the latter subordinates to the former. For Kant, practical reason cannot
subordinate to the theoretical reason because reason’s speculative interest is limited.
Based on Kant’s arguments in the first Critique, our knowledge concerning objective
cognition is restricted to the empirical domain. The unconditioned condition is not in the
system of human knowledge. Practical use of reason, in contrast, is not conditioned. It
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could extend its boundaries over anything empirical because practical reason is
concerned with final end, which is not in the empirical domain.
In Kant’s system, freedom, God, and immortality are the three postulates, which
show the unity of reason. Although theoretical use cannot prove their existence but
practical reason can guarantee their reality. Among them, freedom is the most important
because without it morality is impossible.

4.2 Two cognitions
In my account, freedom as the keystone combines both theoretical reason and
practical reason into a whole structure. Freedom, considered under the speculative use of
reason, is transcendent. If we see everything in the natural world is under the natural law,
then freedom is not in the empirical domain. We do not have empirical cognition of it.
Accordingly, freedom is not an object of the understanding, but an idea of reason.
Freedom is an idea of reason implies that it is merely a regulative principle of reason
because it is not required “to assume a new object beyond experience but only to bring its
use in experience nearer to completeness”. (5:153)
Freedom, considered under the practical use of reason, is immanent.
Consciousness of the moral law brings its transcend use into immanent use. When we are
conscious of the moral law, freedom is not an idea of reason any more, but is transformed
as immanent in that consciousness. Positive freedom is that moral law. That’s why Kant
characterizes freedom as the ratio essendi of the moral law. Accordingly, positive
freedom is not a mere regulative principle of reason, but a constitutive principle. It
constitutes an object that goes beyond empirical. That is the highest good.
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By this way, positive freedom brings speculative use of reason and practical use

of reason into a unity. Although we don’t have cognition of freedom under the
speculative use of reason, we could extend our cognition of freedom under the practical
use of reason, although this cognition is not empirical. As Kant says,
Is our cognition really extended in this way by pure practical reason, and is what
was transcendent for speculative reason immanent in practical reason? Certainly,
but only for practical purposes. (5:133)
5. Conclusion:
Let’s now bring this new thinking of immanent use of freedom back to the Groundwork
III. Kant tries to deduce morality from freedom. He distinguishes between the intelligible
world and the empirical world and claims that morality is possible only if we transfer
ourselves from the sensible world to the intelligible world. Is he asking us to go to
another ontological world? If we choose to see the conception of freedom from the
theoretical perspective, the answer is yes. But, we don’t have to understand it in this way.
After all, Kant concludes that such transcendent freedom is incomprehensible (G 4:463).
From the practical perspective, Kant suggests that we consider the intelligible world as a
standpoint to see the possibility of choosing against one’s own sensibility, which is
determined by nature. This practical understanding of freedom is fully explicated in the
second critique.
In the Groundwork III, Kant discusses a case of the change of character in a
scoundrel. Kant thinks that there is a possibility for that scoundrel to change his
personality to be a better person only after he considers himself as a member of the
intelligible world where he can determine his action by his will freely. “By this
standpoint he is conscious of a good will that, by his own acknowledgements, constitutes
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the law for his evil will as a member of the world of sense—a law of whose authority he
is cognizant even while he transgresses it. The moral “ought” is then his own necessary
“will” as a member of an intelligible world, and is thought by him as “ought” only insofar
as he regards himself at the same time as a member of the world of sense.” (4:455) The
intelligible world is an ontological entity when Kant attempts to prove morality
theoretically in the Groundwork. However, after reconsidering his arguments in the
second critique, we don’t have to see the intelligible world as an ontological entity. The
possibility for the scoundrel to change his character is not to ask the scoundrel to give up
his own body and evil will in the empirical world to go to another perfect world. What
the scoundrel could do is to consider himself as a member of an intelligible world, and to
make the moral “ought” constitute his practical consciousness in the empirical world.
Once he uses his reason correctly and is conscious of the moral law, it is possible for him
to behave according to the moral law, although he is not forced to do so. Freedom,
although it is transcendent metaphysically, is always immanent in this world for practical
use.
In this paper, I argue that freedom should not be understood metaphysically, but
practically in Kant’s moral theory. Metaphysical freedom, even if it were possible, would
not solve the practical question. The conception of freedom, at least for Kant, should be
understood as intimately connected with morality, which is a practical, not a theoretical
enterprise. We cannot prove how freedom is possible; but insofar as it is practically
possible in human beings’ agency, it is real. Through the consciousness of the moral law,
transcendent use of freedom is brought into immanent use of freedom. Freedom is
transformed from an idea of reason into practical reality.
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Of course, this is not the whole story. We haven’t gone deep enough to explore

the structure and the mechanism of the consciousness of the moral law. By doing that, we
hope to understand how transcendent freedom is brought into immanent freedom within
our consciousness and its connection with our will. However, this is beyond the goal of
this paper.
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